Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 31 | Number 2

Article 5

1-1-2009

C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major
League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.: the First
Amendment Versus the Right of Publicity in the
Eighth Circuit
Surina Mann

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Surina Mann, C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.: the First Amendment Versus the
Right of Publicity in the Eighth Circuit, 31 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 303 (2009).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol31/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v.
Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P.: The First Amendment Versus the
Right of Publicity in the Eighth Circuit
by

SURINA MANN*

I. Introduction .................................................
...
303
II. The M akings of the Right of Publicity .................................
305
III. The First Amendment and the Right of Publicity ...........................
308
A . The Zachinni Standard .......................................
308
B. The "N ew sworthy" Exception ...................................
309
C . The Transform ative Test ......................................
310
D . The Predom inant U se Test .....................................
311
IV . Fantasy League B aseball .........................................
312
V . C.B.C. District Court Case History ...................................
313
VI. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Decision .................................
315
A . "Public Dom ain" Rationale .....................................
316
B. Other Policy Arguments Used by the Circuit Court ......................
318
V II.Conclusion .................................................
3 19

I.

Introduction

"The right of publicity makes it unlawful to use another's identity for
commercial advantage without permission."' This right originated and
developed from privacy doctrine,2 but there is one essential difference
between the two: privacy claims involve unwanted intrusion into a
plaintiffs personal life, while publicity claims involve uncompensated and
*
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1. Russell J. Frackman & Tammy C. Bloomfield, The Right of Publicity: Going to the
Dogs?, THE UCLA ONLINE INSTITUTE FOR CYBERSPACE LAW AND POLICY
2 (1996),
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/rftb.html.
2. Id. at 4.
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non-consented exploitation of a plaintiffs identity. 3 The right of publicity
has been acknowledged and applied by most courts, but a difficult question
has arisen when applying this right: When should the right of publicity give
way to the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the First
Amendment? Many different tests have been established to balance the
interests of the First Amendment with those of the right of publicity, but
inconsistency within this area of law remains.4
The ongoing conflict between the First Amendment and the right of
publicity is illustrated in the case of C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing,
Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P. 5 In this case, the suit
was brought in federal court by a fantasy baseball league operator, C.B.C.,
against a company that claimed it had exclusive rights to use the players'
identities. 6 The suit asked for a declaratory judgment that C.B.C. was not
violating the players' rights of publicity. 7 The district court ruled that the
right was not violated, and this decision was appealed.8
On October 16, 2007, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its
ruling on the appeal, affirming the District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri. 9 The appellate court disagreed with the district court in finding
that a right of publicity did exist in this case,' but still foreclosed the right
to bring a claim, finding that the First Amendment trumped the right of
publicity." The circuit court used a "public domain" theory, stating that
because the information used by C.B.C. is available in the public domain, it
is protected by the First Amendment. 12 The court bolstered its reasoning
with other economic and non-economic policy arguments.13
This Note examines the circuit court decision in light of the policy
rationales underlying the right of publicity. This Note will first discuss the
history of the right of publicity, the policy goals the right was designed to
further, and several different tests courts have proffered and used to
balance this right with the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. This
Note then provides the background of fantasy baseball and discusses the

3. Id. at 5.
4. See Infra pp. 8-16.
5. 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006) [hereinafter C.B.C. I].
6. Id. at 1080-82.
7. Id. at 1081.
8. Id. at 1107; C.B.C. Distributing and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2007) (hereinafter C.B.C. I].
9. Id.at 825.
10. Id.at 823.
11. Id. at 824.
12.

Id. at 823.

13. Id. at 823-24.
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history behind the C.B. C. I opinion. Next, this Note critiques the C.B. C. II
decision and discusses the vagueness of the opinion and the apparent
disregard for the purpose of publicity claims. This Note also analyzes the
"public domain" reasoning the circuit court used in finding that the First
Amendment trumped the right of publicity, and predicts and illustrates the
complications that will arise if courts adopt this standard. This Note
concludes that the court should have used a test that would fully recognize
and support the policy goals underlying publicity claims as well as the
values behind protection of freedom of expression. Such a test would have
resulted in a different outcome.
II. The Makings of the Right of Publicity
14
The right of publicity has its origins in common law privacy doctrine.
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the United States
Supreme Court quoted Professor William L. Prosser to describe the
relationship between the law of privacy and the right of publicity:
The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of
four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by
the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common
except that each represents an interference with the right of the
plaintiff... 'to be let alone.' 1 5
According to Prosser, "appropriation for defendant's advantage of the
plaintiffs name or likeness" constitutes one the four torts under privacy
law. 16
The interchangeable use of "the right of publicity" with "the right of
privacy" by courts caused much confusion for plaintiffs. This confusion is
illustrated in the early case of O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., where the
plaintiff, a famous football player, brought an action against a beer
company for using his picture without his permission. 17 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the lower court judgment against the football player indicating
that there was no invasion of privacy in this case. 18 The dissent argued that
the football player should have been able to recover for the mere fact that
the beer company used his name for advertising purposes, but the majority

14. Frackman & Bloomfield, supra note 1, at 4.
15. 433 U.S. 562, 572 n.7 (1977) (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383,
389 (1960)).
16. Frackman & Bloomfield, supra note 1, at 5.
17. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
18. Id. at 169-70.
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concluded that this is not what the plaintiff had pled.1 9 The plaintiff pled
invasion of privacy, and the majority alluded that this was not the same as
claiming injury for misuse of his name.2 °
The distinction between the law of privacy and the right of publicity
was discussed for the first time in Haelan Laboratories Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.21 In this case, the plaintiff and defendant both
manufactured chewing gum. 22 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
induced a baseball player to breach his contract with the plaintiff, which
allowed the plaintiff exclusive rights to market the player's photograph.23
The court rejected the argument that there is no legal interest for a man in
the publication of his picture other than his right to privacy. 24 The
defendant argued that there is no property right in the player's photo.25 The
court disagreed and concluded that along with the right of privacy, "a man
has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant
the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may
validly be made 'in gross,' i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a
business or of anything else. 2 6 This conclusion was drawn by the court in
order to prevent celebrities from27being deprived of profits earned from use
of their names and/or likenesses.
The right of publicity was further differentiated from the right of
privacy in Professor Melville Nimmer's seminal article The Right of
Publicity.28 At the time the article was published, Professor Nimmer
worked as counsel for Paramount Pictures. 29 Nimmer referred to the
"needs of Broadway and Hollywood" in describing the basic foundation
and principles of the right of publicity. 30 While acknowledging that the
right of publicity and the right of privacy overlap in many aspects, 31 he
argued that there is an essential difference between them: "[P]rivacy
plaintiffs were concerned with unwanted intrusion into their personal lives,
while publicity plaintiffs properly complained of uncompensated
19. Id. at 170.
20. Id.
21. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
22. Id. at 867.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 868.
27. Id.
28. Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203-04 (1954).
See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 1996).
29. Cardtoons,95 F.3d at 967.
30. Id.
31. Id.; Frackman & Bloomfield, supra note 1, at 5.
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exploitation of their identities. 32 Courts began recognizing this essential
difference between the right to privacy and the right to publicity and began
acknowledging this difference.3 3
It was not until the Supreme Court decision of Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co. that the right of publicity became judicially
accepted everywhere. 34 In Zacchini, the plaintiff brought an action against
the defendant for videotaping his "human cannonball" act without his
permission and showing the tape on a news program.35 The Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff had a right to recover damages because his "exclusive
control over the publicity given to his performance" was usurped by the
defendant. 36 The Court reasoned that "the broadcast of a film of
petitioner's entire act poses a substantial threat to the economic value of
that performance" due to the fact that the ability to see the act for free
removes the incentive for the public to pay to see the performance.3 7
The rationales used to justify the right of publicity vary from court to
court. However, general policies favoring the right include the following:
[T]he right of publicity protects an individual's interest in personal
dignity and autonomy. With its emphasis on commercial interests,
the right of publicity also secures for plaintiffs the commercial
value of their fame and prevents the unjust enrichment of others
seeking to appropriate that value for themselves. The right to
prohibit unauthorized commercial exploitation of one's identity
allows a person to prevent harmful or excessive commercial use
that may dilute the value of the identity... [T]he right of publicity
indirectly affords protection against false suggestions of
endorsement or sponsorship.3 8
In approximately half of the states, some form of the right of publicity
exists either by statute or at common law. 39 The right of publicity was even
adopted by the 1995 Restatement of Unfair Competition, which defines the
right as follows: "One who appropriates the commercial value of a person's
identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other
indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Frackman & Bloomfield, supra note 1, at T 5.
Zachinni v. Scripps-HowardBroadcastingCo., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
Id. at 578-79.
Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 575.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (1995).
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003).
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appropriate under the rules stated in §§ 48 and 49.,,40 However, the right of
publicity still faces hurdles to its implementation in many courts.
III. The First Amendment and the Right of Publicity
In Cohen v. California,the United States Supreme Court expressed the
following:
The constitutional right of free expression ... is designed and
intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of
public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be
voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of
such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and
more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon
which our political system rests.41
Since the birth of the right of publicity, courts have struggled to42
harmonize that right with the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Courts have taken many different approaches, a few of which are outlined
below.
A.

The Zachinni Standard
The only United States Supreme Court decision that addresses the
struggle between the right of publicity and the First Amendment is
Zacchini.43 Zacchini involved a performer's claim against a television
station for broadcasting his entire "human cannonball" performance.4 4
The Ohio Supreme Court had held below that Zacchini's publicity
claim was trumped by the First Amendment because the television station45
had the right to report news that was a matter of legitimate public interest.
However, the United States Supreme Court found this argument
inapplicable.46 The Court held that the First Amendment did not trump the
right to publicity due to the fact that "the broadcast of a film of petitioner's
entire act poses a substantial threat to the economic value of that
performance. 4 7 The Court also noted that the public would not be
deprived of the performer's act as long as the performer was compensated
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 46.
403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
See Infra pp. 9-16.
433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 578-79.
Id. at 575.
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for his performance. 48 Therefore, the public would still have access to
information that was legitimately of public interest.49
The Court
specifically found that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not protect
media entities when they broadcast a performer's "entire act," as in the case
before it. 50
While the Supreme Court did manage to decide Zacchini on its facts,
the Court failed to establish a universal test for global application when
analyzing the conflict between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment.51 This criticism of the majority's decision is discussed in
Justice Powell's dissent. 52 Justice Powell condemns the fact that the
majority opinion offers no universal framework for similar future cases and
does nothing but decide the case before it. 53 In fact, Justice Powell
deliberates on whether the "entire act" test that the majority lays out is even
clear enough to decide the case before the court.54 Justice Powell's
concerns appear to have been validated since no other case since Zacchini
involving the right to publicity and the First Amendment has been decided
by utilizing the Court's "entire act" standard.
B. The "Newsworthy" Exception
Along with the "entire act" standard, the Zacchini decision can also be
interpreted to advocate a "newsworthy" exception to the right of publicity.
The Court in Zacchini illustrated this exception by stating that "there is no
doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment
protection [and it] is also true that entertainment itself can be important
55
news."
Although the "newsworthy" exception has been adopted by most
courts, the application of the exception has been anything but consistent.
This inconsistency is illustrated by the cases Ali v. Playgirl, Inc. and AnnMargret v. High Society Magazine.56 In Ali, a complaint was brought
alleging the violation of Muhammad Ali's right of publicity when an
unauthorized portrait of a nude man, unmistakably recognizable as
Muhammad Ali, was printed in an issue of Playgirl magazine.5 7 The court

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 578.
Id.
Id. at 574-75.
Id.

52.

Id. at 579.

53.

Id.

54. Id.
55. Id. at 578.
56.
57.

447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 725.
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ruled that the "newsworthy" exception to the right of publicity did not
apply in the case because there was no "informational or newsworthy
dimension" to the portrait. 58 In contrast, in Ann-Margret, a partially nude
photograph of Ann-Margret reprinted from a scene in a movie was deemed
to be protected by the "newsworthy" exception because it was "in the orbit
of public interest and scrutiny., 59 The opposite results in these two
arguably very similar cases illustrate the difficulty courts face in the
application of the "newsworthy" exception due to its inherent subjectivity
and the lack of clear and consistent factors to be weighed. As the line
between news and entertainment becomes increasingly blurred in our
culture and a multitude of new sources of information become available,
this test seems to become less and less workable.
C. The Transformative Test
The transformative test was first introduced in Comedy III Productions,
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.60 Comedy III owned all rights to a comedy show
called "The Three Stooges. 6 1 Saderup, an artist who composed images out
of charcoal and reproduced them on T-shirts and other products,62 created
images of "The Three Stooges" without the consent of Comedy III and sold
products depicting those images. Comedy III brought an action against
Saderup alleging violation of its right to publicity.6 3
The court in Comedy III focused on the first "fair use" factor, "the
purpose and character of the use," in fashioning a test for balancing the
right of publicity and the First Amendment.6 4 In the case where a "new"
work is created using images or elements arguably protected by the right of
publicity, the court stressed the importance of determining whether the new
work is "transformative. 65 Many definitions of the inquiry are scattered
throughout the decision:
[W]hether the new work merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the
original creation, or instead adds something new ....[W]hether
the celebrity likeness is one of the 'raw materials' from which an
original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation
of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in
question ....[And] whether a product containing a celebrity's
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 727.
Ann-Margret, 498 F. Supp. at 405-06.
25 Cal. 4th 387 (2001).
Id.at393.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 404.
Id.

StprinR 20091

THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the
defendant's own expression rather than the celebrity's likeness.66
The California Supreme Court found that this factor should be at the
"heart" of any attempt to balance the First Amendment and the right of
publicity, because whether the public policy goals of one outweigh the
public policy goals of the other depends on whether the depiction is
"transformative. ' 67 When the depiction is "transforma-tive," the First
Amendment policy goal of encouraging creativity and free speech
outweighs the right of publicity purpose of allowing a person to protect his
or her own persona.68 The court also reasoned that a "transformative"
depiction would not threaten the economic interest protected by the right to
publicity because these works are not the same as real celebrity depictions
and would not harm the market for celebrity memorabilia. 69 Therefore,
"transformative" depictions should be protected by the First Amendment.
In this case, the court ruled that Saderup's images were not protected
by the First Amendment because there was no "creative contribution" to
the works.70 He worked only to create literal recreations of "The Three
Stooges" to exploit them for financial gain.7 Therefore, the policy goals of
the right of publicity far outweighed any First Amendment concerns.
D. The Predominant Use Test

The predominant use test was first introduced in Estate of Presley v.
Russen.72 There, the estate of Elvis Presley brought suit against Russen
asking for an injunction to stop Russen from using anything affiliated with
Elvis Presley's persona for his concerts. v3 The court explained the
predominant purpose test by stating:
[T]he purpose of the portrayal in question must be examined to
determine if it predominantly serves a social function valued by
the protection of free speech. If the portrayal mainly serves the
purpose of contributing information, which is not false or
defamatory, to the public debate of political or social issues or of
providing the free expression of creative talent which contributes
to society's cultural enrichment, then the portrayal generally will
be immune from liability. If, however, the portrayal functions
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 404, 406.
Id. at 404-05.
Id. at 405.
Id.
Id. at 409.

Id.
513 F. Supp. 1339, 1356 (D.N.J. 1981).
Id. at 1348-50.
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primarily as a means of commercial
exploitation, then such
74
immunity will not be granted.
The court found that the defendant used Elvis Presley's persona
primarily as a means of commercial exploitation. 75 By presenting a live
performance by an Elvis impersonator, he appropriated the very reason that
Elvis gained his reputation.
Therefore, the court declared77 that the First
Amendment did not trump the right of publicity in this case.
This predominant use test was also illustrated in Doe v. TCI
Cablevision.78 Tony Twist, a former professional hockey player, brought
suit against the creators, publishers, and promoters of a comic book using
his name as one of the villains. 79 The Supreme Court of Missouri held that
if the predominant use of the likeness is to exploit commercial value, the
right of publicity trumps the First Amendment even if there is some
"expressive" substance.8 ° In this case, the court held that the primary
purpose of using Twist's name was to sell comic books and related
products, and therefore the First Amendment could not insulate the
defendants from liability.81
Both the "transformative" and the "predominant purpose" tests get to
the heart of what courts should look at when deciding whether the First
Amendment should trump the right of publicity in a case. Both tests look
to see whether the use of the identity was done for a purpose that the First
Amendment serves to protect. If so, that use is protected by the First
Amendment and no right of publicity claim exists.
IV. Fantasy League Baseball
The shortest possible definition of Fantasy Baseball is this: You
own your own team and get to choose what Major League
Baseball players play on your team.
The first thing to do when establishing a fantasy baseball team is to
select owners. Once owners are established, the owners give their teams a
name. After this, a draft is scheduled where the owners are able to choose
74.
75.

Id. at 1356.

76.
77.

Id. at 1361.
Id.
Id.

78.

110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003).

79. Id. at 365.
80. Id. at 374.
81. Id.
82. Lee Andrew Henderson, What is Fantasy Baseball?, ASSOCIATED CONTENT, Mar. 26,
2007, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/183230/what-is_fantasy-baseball.html.
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any Major League baseball players they want for their teams. Whether a
team wins depends on how the players do in their real season. How the
players perform during the actual season is recorded and the team that has
the best performing players wins.83
Every team position that actually needs to be filled in a Major League
team also needs to be filled in a fantasy baseball team so players must be
chosen to fulfill these different positions. Players are tracked in many
different categories of their performance and not just their overall
performance. Categories may include number of homeruns or number of
bases stolen. Most leagues also include negative categories. "For example
the pitching categories in your league won't be just Wins, Strikeouts, and
Saves, which are all positive categories for a pitcher. The pitching
categories could also
include walks, runs, and losses, which are all negative
84
stats for a pitcher.,
"Sixteen million adults played fantasy sports in 2006, spending an
average of just under $500 a year and generating an economic impact of
more than $1 billion a year., 85 Fantasy baseball is a growing industry and
a large gaming market where people spend many
hours and a substantial
86
amount of money to participate in the leagues.
V. C.A.C. District Court Case History
C.B.C. Distributing and Marketing, Inc. ("C.B.C.") is a Missouri
corporation that distributes and sells fantasy sports products, including
fantasy baseball games accessible over the internet. 87 The Major League
Baseball Players Association (the "Players Association") is comprised of
almost all Major League baseball players and is the bargaining
representative for those players. 88 Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, L.P. ("Advanced Media") was formed by different Major League
Baseball teams to control the internet and interactive media aspect of Major
League Baseball. 89
From the period of July 1, 1995, to December 31, 2004, C.B.C. entered
into license agreements with the Players Association that allowed C.B.C. to
use "the names, nicknames, likenesses, signatures, pictures, playing
83, Id. at para. 4-5.
84. Id. at para. 10.
85. Jenny Price, Researchers studying fantasy baseball and 'competitive fandom,'
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON NEWS,
11, July 13, 2007, http://www.news.wisc.edu/
13936,

86. Id.
87.

C.B.C. ,443 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.

88. Id. at 1079-80.
89. Id. at 1080.
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records, and/or biographical data of each player" for its products.9" In
2005, Advanced Media entered into an agreement with the Players
Association allowing it to use the same names, images and data for all
interactive media. 91 On February 4, 2005, Advanced Media approached
C.B.C. and proposed that C.B.C. promote Advanced Media's fantasy
baseball games on C.B.C.'s website in exchange for a percentage of the
profits. 92 C.B.C. responded by filing for declaratory relief in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, asking the court to
declare that C.B.C. had the right to use the names and statistics of the
players without obtaining a license agreement. 93 Advanced Media and the
Players Association, which intervened in the case, counterclaimed
that any
94
such use by C.B.C. violated the players' right of publicity.
In Missouri, to establish a violation of a right of publicity, the
following elements must be established: "(1) That defendant used
plaintiffs name as a symbol of his identity (2)95without consent (3) and with
the intent to obtain a commercial advantage.,
The district court concluded that C.B.C. did not violate the players'
right of publicity because the "identity" and "commercial advantage"
elements were not adequately established. 96 The court found that the
burden of proof on the "identity" element was not met because using a
player's name with his statistics does not involve his "character,
personality, reputation, or physical appearance," which is the core of his
identity.97
The court concluded that the plaintiffs burden on the
"commercial advantage" element was also not met in this case by
distinguishing it from other cases where the burden was met.98 The court
reasoned that "[u]nlike cases where the commercial advantage element of
the right of publicity has been found, there is nothing about CBC's fantasy
games which suggests that any Major League baseball player is associated
with CBC's games or that any player endorses or sponsors the games in
any way," and therefore
the rights of the players are not being exploited for
99
commercial gain.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 1080-81.
Id. at 1081.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1082.
Id. at 1084-85 (quoting Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 365 (Mo. 2003)).
C.B.C. 1, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1088-89.
Id. at 1089.
Id. at 1086.

99.

Id.
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The court also concluded that even if the players' right of publicity had
been violated, the First Amendment would have trumped the right of
publicity.100 The court reasoned that the statistics are "historical fact[s]"
that inform the public, and this interest outweighs the interests that the right
of publicity may hold in this case. 1
The court went on to enjoin
Advanced Media and the
Players
Association
from interfering with
10 2
games.
fantasy
C.B.C.'s
VI. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
The decision of the district court was appealed to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals and an opinion was issued on October 16, 2007.103 The
Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's ruling but did not agree with
04
all of the district court's findings.1
In contrast to the district court's opinion, the Court of Appeals found
that a right of publicity did exist for the players in this case.10 5 According
to the court, the use of the players' names by C.B.C. was understood by the
subscribers as referring to actual Major League Baseball players and
therefore, the burden of proving the "identity" element was met. 0 6 The
burden of proving the "commercial advantage" element needed for the
right of publicity in Missouri was also met, according to the court.'0 7 The
court stated that this element focuses on the defendant's intent to gain
profit from using the plaintiffs identity, and in this case it is apparent that
C.B.C. did use the players' names in order to make a profit. 0 8 0Therefore,
9
the court concluded that the players did have a right of publicity.
Even though the court found that the players' right of publicity claim
was valid, the court determined that this right was trumped by the First
Amendment." l0 The court stressed that First Amendment considerations
must be balanced against the right of publicity and determined that the
former outweighs the latter in this situation."

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1107.
C.B.C II, 505 F.3d at 818.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 823.
Id. at 822.
Id. at 823.

108.
109.

Id. at 822-23.
Id. at 823.

110.
111.

Id. at 824.
Id.
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"Public Domain" Rationale

The court mostly used a "public domain" rationale in allowing the First
Amendment to trump the right of publicity.1 12 The reasoning used by the
court is that the information used in C.B.C.'s fantasy baseball games is all
available in the public domain and therefore, the use of this information
should be protected by the First Amendment.11 3 The court found that "it
would be strange law that a person would not have
afirst amendment right
'1 14
to use information that is available to everyone."
This "public domain" rationale used by the court in determining
whether the First Amendment trumps the right of publicity contradicts
many policy goals that the right of publicity exists to further. One of the
policies behind establishing a right of publicity is "that significant
expenditure of time, effort, talent, and finances is necessary to become
famous and that due to such investment, celebrities justifiably deserve any
money flowing from their fame."' 1 5 The right of publicity itself protects
people from their identities being exploited for commercial advantage
without their permission.11 6 The people that the right is trying to protect
are celebrities 1 7 but celebrities are the people who are most likely to be in
the "public domain" due to their fame. The identities most commonly used
for commercial advantage are well-known and recognizable celebrities the
target audience knows and can relate to, such as the baseball players in this
case. 118 There is public information readily available about them, but the
right of publicity exists to protect them from unfair commercial gain
resulting from misuse of that information. 1 9 The very people that the right
of publicity exists to protect are those who likely have information about
them in the "public domain," and it is not "strange law" to allow these
people to be protected, considering that this is the purpose of the right of
publicity.
"Public domain" literally means the "status of publications, products,
and processes that are not protected under patent or copyright.' 120 The
right of publicity involves a real property interest in a person's name or
likeness, and the development of this area of law was necessary precisely
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because that property right is not protected by copyright. 2' The right of
publicity recognizes a property interest for a person's name or likeness,
even though it is readily available in the "public domain." Therefore, the
"public domain" rationale should not be used to justify allowing the First
Amendment principles to overcome the right of publicity.
The "public domain" rationale may have worked for the court in this
case, but the question remains how this standard could work for other
typical right of publicity cases, such as use of players' identities in video
games or advertisements.
Applying the "public domain" standard,
anything that is readily available to the public is protected by the First
Amendment. 122 Using this standard, every right of publicity claim could be
trumped by First Amendment guarantees due to heightened technological
advances. Because the internet is available to almost everyone, even a
picture of a celebrity can be found online and is accessible to everyone.
Taken to its logical end, this would mean that the use of a person's picture
for commercial advantage would be trumped by the First Amendment
simply because the information is readily available in the "public domain."
The "public domain" rationale was properly rejected in the case of
Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises,Inc.' 23 In this case, the suit was brought
by well known golfers whose names, biographies, and profiles were used in
a golfing board game without their permission. 124 The defendants used a
"public domain" argument that the information was widely available to the
public, and therefore they should be able to republish the same
information. 125 The court rejected this rationale and concluded that "It is
unfair that one should be permitted to commercialize or exploit or
capitalize upon another's name, reputation or accomplishments merely
because the owner's accomplishments have been highly publicized. ' 26
The "public domain" rationale was also rejected by the court in
Uhlaender v. Henricksen, where suit was brought by several hundred
Major League baseball players to prevent companies from using their
names and accomplishments in fantasy league baseball table games, almost
identical to the facts of C.B.C.127 In rejecting the "public domain" rationale
promoted by the defendants, the court reasoned:
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A name is commercially valuable as an endorsement of a product
or for use for financial gain only because the public recognizes it
and attributes good will and feats of skill or accomplishments of
one sort or another to that personality. To hold that such publicity
destroys a right to sue for appropriation of a name or likeness
would negate any and all causes of action, for only by disclosure
and public acceptance does the name of a celebrity
have any value
28
at all to make its unauthorized use enjoinable.1
The use of the "public domain" rationale by the court completely
disregards the whole purpose of implementing the right of publicity.
Instead of justifying the use of one's identity because it is within the
"public domain," the court should heavily scrutinize its use. Because
virtually anything can be available to the public at the click of a mouse on
the internet, the court should not use this to bar right of publicity claims.
The court should look to see how the identity is being used and determine
whether the policies of the First Amendment outweigh those of the right of
publicity based on that evaluation. The tests that have been used by many
courts, the predominant purpose test and the transformative test, look to see
how the information was used and whether that use should be protected by
the First Amendment. Whether the information is in the "public domain"
should not factor into the decision whatsoever.
B.

Other Policy Arguments Used by the Circuit Court

In addition to the "public domain" rationale, the C.B.C. circuit court
also referenced another court's holding, reasoning that since baseball is a
popular national sport, the interest of the public in being able to follow
baseball records should be protected. 129 The court used the case Gionfriddo
v. Major League Baseball in support of this contention. 130 In Gionfriddo,
former baseball players brought an action for invasion of their right of
publicity when their statistics were used in a media guide that was
distributed to the press at All-Star and World Series games., 3' In this case,
the court found that the First Amendment trumped the right of publicity
because the purpose of the guides was to display information to which the
132
public is entitled.
C.B.C. can clearly be distinguished from Gionfriddo because the
statistics used by operators of fantasy baseball leagues are not used simply
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to convey information, but rather used to make a profit. The Gionfriddo
court focused on the nature and context of the information used to
determine whether it was worthy of the protection offered by the First
Amendment.' 33 Players' records in fantasy league games are used by
companies to entice the public to play so the purveyors of the games can
make a profit. The records are not simply used to display useful
information to the public, which clearly distinguishes C.B.C. from
Gionfriddo.
The appellate court's opinion also states that the economic goals that
the right of publicity seeks to protect, such as the right of an individual to
"reap the rewards of his or her endeavors," would not be furthered by
allowing a cause of action under the C.B.C. facts, because baseball players
are already largely compensated by their salaries and sponsorship
arrangements. 134 However, the fact that a baseball player may be
financially well-rewarded for his athletic performance by the team that
employs him should not prevent him from reaping the rewards of his
performance and fame in other arenas. Courts should not attempt to place
themselves in the position of determining what threshold of compensation
precludes right of publicity claims simply because the potential plaintiff
already makes a lot of money. The compensation that the plaintiff receives
for his or her work should not factor into whether the First Amendment
trumps the right of publicity. This area of inquiry has absolutely nothing to
do with furthering the goals of the First Amendment or the right of
publicity.

VII. Conclusion
In determining whether the right of publicity is trumped by the First
Amendment in any case, courts must analyze the way in which the
celebrity's name and likeness is being used. This imperative inquiry is
illustrated in the tests that have already been formulated by courts, such as
the predominant purpose test and the transformative test, all of which look
to see what the purpose of the use of the identity is before determining
whether the First Amendment trumps the right of publicity.' 35 This
balancing test must also take into consideration the policy goals of both the
First Amendment and the right of publicity in determining which test to
use.
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The court's "public domain" rationale in C.B.C. Distributing and
' did not
Marketing,Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P. 36
take into consideration any of the policy goals that the right of publicity
was created to further. In fact, the rationale specifically undermined the
policy goals of the right of publicity and failed to recognize the reason the
right even exists today. Furthermore, the "public domain" rationale
becomes very dangerous when being applied to other right of publicity
cases and is not a workable standard. The "public domain" rationale
should play no part in analyzing whether the right of publicity is trumped
by the First Amendment.
If the court in C.B.C. had used the proper test for determining whether
the First Amendment needed to trump the right of publicity and had looked
to the purpose of the use, the First Amendment would not likely have
trumped the right of publicity. It is apparent from the case that the
identities of the players were used to gain profit. Their statistics and
records were shown to entice people to select them for their team. The
statistics were not "transformed" whatsoever and they are not the type of
creative expression that the First Amendment is meant to protect.
Therefore, the outcome of the C.B.C. case would have been different had a
proper test been used.
The court in C.B.C. failed to determine the purpose of using the
players' identities in the fantasy baseball leagues. The court came up with
policy-based reasons to support its conclusion of allowing the First
Amendment to trump the right of publicity in this case without even
determining the first essential question of purpose of use.' 37 The test
formulated by the court in this decision is vague, unworkable, and
undermines the very essence of the right of publicity.
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